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Arguably the closest that Britain has ever experienced to military rule was at certain 
times during the period from 1647 to 1660.  English forces conquered Ireland and 
Scotland in 1649-50 and 1650-1 respectively, and the two kingdoms were then 
forcibly ‘settled’ and incorporated into an English commonwealth.  In England, 
meanwhile, the army repeatedly intervened to purge or disperse Parliaments: in 1647, 
1648, 1653, 1654 and 1659 (twice).  For about fifteen months, in 1655-7, England 
and Wales were governed by Major-Generals who exercised sweeping powers to 
enforce order, preserve security and enforce a ‘reformation of manners’.  All these 
developments raise profound questions about the nature of Cromwellian government 
in general, and the relationship between politics and military rule in particular.  
Austin Woolrych argued, some years ago, that the Cromwellian Protectorate was not 
a military dictatorship in any meaningful sense.  He suggested that the regime 
possessed neither the will, nor the means, to impose military rule, that it generally 
respected the rule of law, and that the military presence in local government even 
during the time of the Major-Generals was limited.1  Yet the nature of the interaction 
between the military and the political – in shaping government, in influencing 
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policies, and in forming the careers of Oliver Cromwell and other leading figures – 
remains complex and merits much fuller exploration.  The four books under review 
address these and related themes from a range of different viewpoints.  Each throws 
new light on these problems, two by considering the nature of government during the 
Protectorate, and the other two through biographical studies of Cromwell and of John 
Lambert, another brilliant military leader who became one of the key political players 
of the 1650s.  Collectively, these books offer valuable and complementary 
perspectives on complicated issues that have been less deeply studied than they 
deserve to be, especially for the period of the Protectorate itself. 
 
I 
Barry Coward’s The Cromwellian Protectorate provides a welcome synthesis of 
recent work on the years 1653-9 that is also an important reinterpretation in its own 
right.  The book is divided into two halves.  The first comprises five broadly 
chronological chapters running from December 1653 to May 1659 and is organized 
around the theme of ‘the Protectorate and the quest for reformation’.  The second half 
is analytical in structure, and assesses the impact of the Protectorate on, in turn, the 
wider world, Scotland and Ireland, and England and Wales.  Throughout, Coward’s 
main aim ‘is to show that the depiction of the regime as a “retreat from revolution” is 
very misleading indeed’ (p. 2).  In this, he succeeds convincingly.  His account 
accentuates the dynamism, ambition and vision of the regime, and he underlines its 
lasting achievements more emphatically than has been fashionable of late. 
 He regards those achievements as essentially fivefold.  First, the regime had a 
profound impact on Ireland and was responsible for the transfer of social and political 
dominance from the Irish Catholic elite to the Protestant landed classes.  The 
consequent ‘Protestant Ascendancy’, that lasted until the early twentieth century, was 
the direct result of Cromwellian policies.  Secondly, the Protectorate strengthened the 
long-term development of the British ‘fiscal-military state’, not least through high 
levels of direct taxation, and this in turn helped to transform Britain into a major 
world power from the opening decades of the eighteenth century onwards.  Thirdly 
and fourthly, Coward lists the growing popular awareness of, and participation in, 
debates on fundamental and divisive political and religious issues.  The last and ‘most 
important legacy of the Cromwellian Protectorate’ was that ‘a broad national Church 
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was never again established’ and that it had ‘made a major contribution towards 
making the division between Church and Chapel a feature of British life that has 
lasted until our own day’ (p. 194).  Coward sees these as the five principal reasons for 
the ‘persistent grin’ that – Cheshire Cat-like – the Cromwellian Protectorate left 
behind. 
 Why, then, despite these very real achievements, did the Protectorate last for 
only five-and-a-half years?  Throughout Coward’s account, the underlying 
antagonism between the army leaders and many of the civilian politicians represented 
in Parliament forms a running theme and was apparent from the very inception of the 
Protectorate.  Coward argues that the Instrument of Government which established 
the regime ‘demonstrates a marked bias against “over-mighty” Parliaments, of the 
kind which its drafters [a small group of army officers led by Lambert] clearly 
thought had ruled between 1649 and 1653’ (p. 26).  Small wonder, then, that the first 
Protectorate Parliament launched ‘sustained attacks on the army’, prompting Coward 
to conclude that ‘more important, even than [this] Parliament’s failure to carry out 
reforms and maintain liberty for tender consciences, was its hostile attitude to the 
army’ (pp. 46-7).  Even during the rather more successful second Protectorate 
Parliament there were ‘continuing signs of opposition within the Protectorate’s main 
power base, the army’ (p. 96), and Coward argues persuasively that the years from 
1656-7 onwards saw the gradual ‘emergence of an alliance between 
Commonwealthsmen and army malcontents that was to prove fatally disastrous as far 
as the Cromwellian Protectorate was concerned’ (p. 97).  That alliance, he suggests, 
was directly responsible for the eventual collapse of both the second and third 
Protectorate Parliaments.  Cromwell came to believe that a sudden dissolution of the 
second Parliament in February 1658 was ‘the only means of overcoming the problem 
of an army-Commonwealthsmen alliance and thereby preserving army unity behind 
the regime’ (p. 98).  Similarly, Coward argues that this alliance, together with the 
growing hostility of senior army officers towards Richard Cromwell and the third 
Protectorate Parliament from the end of March 1659, caused the collapse of the 
Parliament in April and the demise of the Protectorate the following month.  It is most 
welcome that Coward’s book covers the Ricardian Protectorate as well, and his 
account is refreshingly original in that he presents its fall as quite sudden and ‘not 
inevitable’ (p. 101). 
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 Although Richard’s achievements as Lord Protector should not be 
underestimated, his father stood alone in his ability to straddle the highly contrasted 
worlds of the army leaders and the civilian politicians: uniquely, he inhabited both 
camps and could understand both outlooks.  Yet his deepest commitment was always 
to the radical religious agenda that he shared with many of his fellow officers, and 
specifically to the promotion of liberty of conscience.  In line with his own earlier 
biography,2 and in common with the prevailing trend in recent scholarship, Coward 
regards Cromwell’s religious beliefs as not only basically sincere but also crucial for 
our understanding of his career and policies: ‘The consistency and fervour with which 
Cromwell expressed his views make it difficult to sustain the idea that Cromwell’s 
religious zeal was insincere … On most occasions when Cromwell acted ruthlessly he 
did so primarily to advance his hopes of bringing about a godly reformation in 
Britain’ (p. 15).  Far from blunting his resolve, the setbacks that Cromwell 
experienced during the Protectorate seem only to have strengthened his determination 
to turn Britain into a godly commonwealth.  Indeed, ‘Cromwell came to place more 
and more importance on achieving this “reformation of manners” as each year passed, 
as he came to identify this as the main thing required of him and the nation by God.’ 
(p. 17).  Coward even presents the dying Cromwell as more resilient and less 
disillusioned and defeated than some recent accounts suggest, and he argues that at 
the time of Cromwell’s death, ‘the regime’s visionary aspirations were still very much 
alive’ (p. 101). 
The book’s value as a teaching resource is greatly enhanced by the admirable 
selection of documents printed at the back.  Very wisely, Coward has almost entirely 
avoided documents that are already easily accessible in collections such as J.P. 
Kenyon’s The Stuart constitution;3 instead, he reproduces extracts from thirty-two 
less familiar documents that offer a wide variety of perspectives on the Protectorate.  
They represent many different types of sources, including speeches in Parliament, 
Protectoral proclamations, contemporary newspapers and pamphlets, local petitions, 
private letters and diaries, and the reports of foreign ambassadors.  The contemporary 
viewpoints range from the most deeply hostile (such as Slingsby Bethel or John 
Evelyn), through the sceptical (Andrew Marvell or Richard Baxter), to the most 
sympathetic (Marchamont Nedham).  The bibliographical essay is also helpful: it is 
well organized, and full enough to facilitate detailed study by including articles and 
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unpublished theses, as well as monographs, while remaining clear and efficient in its 
guidance. 
There are a handful of minor errors or judgements with which I would 
quibble.  Cromwell’s personal motto, incorporated into the great seal of the 
Protectorate, should read ‘pax quaeritur [not overitur] bello’ (i.e. ‘peace is sought by 
war’) (p. 122).  The statement that ‘the powers of the restored monarchy were not 
exactly the same as those possessed by monarchs before 1641’ (p. 191) obscures the 
fact that Charles II was consciously restored on the basis of the constitutional reforms 
that had received royal assent up to the summer of 1641.  Coward’s favourable 
verdict on Cromwell’s foreign policy, that ‘only the benefit of hindsight gives any 
credence to the charge that the Protectorate’s foreign policies destroyed a European 
balance of power to the subsequent advantage of France’ (p. 133), may not take full 
account of the fact that Slingsby Bethel vigorously argued this point in The world’s 
mistake in Oliver Cromwell as early as 1668.4  But overall this is a fine and important 




In assessing Cromwell’s attempts to promote a ‘reformation of manners’, Coward 
argues perceptively that ‘any progress towards the hoped-for cultural revolution was 
very patchy and limited … There were simply not enough godly ministers and 
magistrates committed to the campaign of moral reformation to make it anything 
other than a patchy success’ (p. 172).  This problem also forms a central theme of 
Christopher Durston’s splendid study of the Major-Generals.  Beautifully written and 
deeply researched in both national and local archives, this monograph comes as close 
to being a definitive treatment of its subject as might be envisaged. 
 In general, the Major-Generals have not received a good press either from 
contemporaries or from historians.  At best, they have been portrayed as a short-lived 
and disastrous attempt to promote a ‘reformation of manners’ that was doomed to 
failure because of lack of time, resources and popular support.  At worst, they have 
been seen as ‘bashaws’ or ‘satraps’ who imposed authoritarian and bigoted rule on 
England and Wales, and thereby helped to engender a dislike of standing armies that 
persisted for generations.5  Interestingly and persuasively, Durston’s argument 
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stresses the godly aspects of the Major-Generals, rather than the military.  He 
suggests that ‘the quintessential feature of the rule of the Major-Generals was not that 
it was army rule, nor that it was London rule, but rather that it was godly rule, and it 
was as such that it was decisively rejected by the great majority of the English and 
Welsh people’ (p. 232).  His book’s sub-title – ‘godly government during the English 
Revolution’ – gives a very fair indication of what he regards as the most important 
dimension of the Major-Generals and their activities. 
 This is not, of course, to lose sight of other facets of their work.  Durston 
shows that they did have at least some success tightening up security.  During the 
period of their rule, for example, over 14,000 bonds were imposed upon suspected 
Royalists.  The Major-Generals episode as a whole reveals just how important the 
armed forces were in safeguarding the Cromwellian regime.  Durston argues that they 
made conspiracy against the Protectorate more difficult and dangerous, and that they 
thus did much to ensure its survival.  More generally, their impact on local 
government, the composition of benches and so forth, was at best patchy, and Durston 
shows that ‘in many parts of the country the Major-Generals had no lasting impact of 
any significance on the magistracy, shrievalty and the other traditional organs of local 
government’ (p. 92).  Furthermore, he makes a convincing case for believing that the 
Decimation Tax was widely perceived as so unfair on Royalists, and so contrary to 
the Rump Parliament’s Act of Pardon and Oblivion (February 1652), that it was ‘from 
the outset doomed to failure’ (p. 120). 
 It was, however, the religious dimension of the Major-Generals’ agenda that 
Durston thinks was most directly responsible for their downfall.  His fine analysis of 
their backgrounds, careers and beliefs leads him to conclude that they ‘were a set of 
godly governors who were convinced that they were doing God’s vital work and that 
He would therefore not let them fail’.  He argues that their religious conviction was 
both an asset and a handicap: although it gave them energy, persistence and 
enthusiasm for their challenging task, it also ensured that local communities often 
regarded them as an unwelcome intrusion and hoped to remove them as soon as 
possible.  Just how much most people in England and Wales resented the Major-
Generals became clear in the late summer of 1656 during the elections to the second 
Protectorate Parliament, which ‘quickly came to be seen as a referendum on the rule 
of the Major-Generals’ (p. 190).  Those elections, dominated by outcries against 
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‘swordsmen’ and ‘decimators’, produced a Parliament deeply unsympathetic to the 
Major-Generals, even after the Council had excluded just over a hundred of its 
members before it assembled.  The meeting of the second Protectorate Parliament 
marked the effective end of the Major-Generals experiment.  Of the eighteen Major-
Generals and their deputies, all except George Fleetwood were returned to Parliament 
and in the autumn of 1656 they left their localities and journeyed to Westminster.  
The Parliament’s hostility towards them soon became evident, and in late January 
1657 a majority of members effectively voted to destroy them by refusing to renew 
the Decimation Tax, thereby removing their financial underpinning. 
 The rule of the Major-Generals thus presents a microcosm of the story of the 
Protectorate in general.  Their safeguarding of security against possible Royalist 
threats helped the regime to survive, yet their drive for a ‘reformation of manners’ 
was so unpopular as to bring about their own downfall.  As Durston writes, ‘their 
campaign for moral reform must … be regarded as a clear failure … Despite their 
undoubted commitment to the campaign, in the face of widespread popular hostility 
and resentment Cromwell’s Major-Generals simply did not possess the means to force 
people to behave in the manner they believed they should’ (p. 179).  In a sense, 
Cromwell had only himself to blame for this situation, for any ruler willing to govern 
‘for [the people’s] good not what pleases them’6 must surely be prepared to encounter 




One of the most prominent Major-Generals, John Lambert, is the subject of a fine 
new biography by David Farr.  This is the first book-length treatment of Lambert to 
have appeared since W.H. Dawson’s Cromwell’s understudy in 1938.7  Farr’s book, 
admirably developed out of his Cambridge PhD thesis,8 shows an impressive 
command of both primary and secondary sources, and it places Lambert within the 
context of his times most effectively.  Farr’s frequent use of extended quotations from 
primary sources is especially commendable because it allows the reader to hear 
Lambert and his contemporaries speaking for themselves.  Among Farr’s most 
original and interesting conclusions is his emphasis on the importance of kinship, 
which he calls ‘a key determinant in Lambert’s career’ (p. 227).  He argues that 
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despite his prominence in the Interregnum regimes, Lambert gave assistance to those 
of his kin who were Cavaliers (including the Tempests, the Ingrams, and above all Sir 
John Belasyse) or Catholics (for example the Morleys).  Such favours worked 
reciprocally, and Farr reconstructs how Lambert was himself the beneficiary of 
similar kindnesses during his imprisonment after the Restoration.  Farr concludes that 
‘if there was any constant in Lambert’s life and career it was based around a kinship 
network that had been shaped by his family’s past’ (p. 228). 
 Some of the most stimulating sections in Farr’s study concern the nature of the 
republican regimes and the relationship between Lambert’s military and political 
careers.  Like Austin Woolrych, Farr suggests that ‘even at the height of [Lambert’s] 
or Cromwell’s power a full-scale military dictatorship was never a real prospect’ (p. 
147).  Indeed, according to Farr, Lambert was ‘not willing to establish a blatant 
military regime’ (p. 201).  This is certainly not to downplay the significance of 
Lambert’s military role in shaping his political attitudes and decisions.  Farr argues 
that ‘protection of the military cause remained at the heart of all of Lambert’s public 
political actions’, but that ‘throughout his career’ he ‘had to adapt to the new 
circumstances in which he found himself’ in the sense of adjusting what he did in 
order best to ‘protect what he perceived as essentially the same “cause”’ (p. 228).  In 
particular, Farr sheds much new light on four episodes that offer excellent case 
studies of how Lambert responded to changing circumstances. 
 First, Farr’s learned and thoughtful discussion of the formulation and 
promotion of the Heads of the Proposals in 1647 (pp. 58-63) provides plentiful 
evidence for ‘concluding that contemporary evidence supports the traditional reading 
of the Heads as an essentially army document.  The sources suggest that the army, 
and in particular Ireton, played the crucial role in their formulation’ (p. 62).  Farr 
corroborates, and adds to, Mark Kishlansky’s criticisms of John Adamson’s account 
of the genesis of the Heads,9 and maintains that the proposals were principally the 
work of Ireton and other senior officers, and that Lambert was well aware of them.  
Secondly, Farr traces a direct continuity between the Heads and the Instrument of 
Government (1653), of which Lambert was the main draftsman.  He suggests that 
both documents reveal a ‘relative conservatism’ that should ‘be seen in the context of 
[Lambert’s] private actions during the 1650s on behalf of his defeated royalist and 
Catholic kin’ (p. 228).  The Instrument, Farr argues, manifested a ‘distrust of 
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Parliament in the constitution’: ‘a key facet of Lambert’s political thinking was the 
belief that Parliament had to be subject to some check if it was not to simply take over 
the prerogative of the monarchy.  This idea was central to his view of the Instrument 
… Parliament and the single person was to be balanced by a powerful council’ (pp. 
128-9).  It was no surprise, therefore, that such thinking placed Lambert on a collision 
course with Parliament and ultimately with the single person himself, culminating in 
his final breach with Cromwell in 1657. 
 Thirdly, Farr convincingly argues that Lambert’s desire to limit the powers of 
Parliament and the single person, and his preference for a ‘military-based Senate’ (p. 
229), naturally led him to oppose the Humble Petition and Advice (1657), with its 
enhancement of Parliament’s constitutional position and its offer of the kingship to 
Cromwell.  The contemporary debate over the kingship reflected a power struggle 
between military and civilians – personified by Lambert and Broghill respectively – 
that lay at the heart of the Protectorate.  The army’s opposition to kingship, led by 
Lambert, seems to have been a crucial reason why Cromwell in the end decided to 
refuse the title, but the fact that he delayed for so long over whether to accept an offer 
so deeply rooted in Broghill’s civilian politics apparently caused a serious rift 
between Cromwell and Lambert.  That rift prompted Lambert’s refusal to take the 
oath of loyalty required by the new constitution, and Cromwell’s consequent 
insistence that he resign his commands, thereby marginalizing the man who up until 
that time had been widely regarded as his most likely successor. 
 Fourthly, if Lambert’s commitment to the army underpinned his opposition to 
the Humble Petition and Advice and the kingship, and led to his falling out with 
Cromwell, it also stymied his attempts in 1658-60 to secure a settlement after 
Cromwell’s death.  Lambert was the key figure within the army in brokering an 
alliance with republican politicians such as Sir Henry Vane.  But in the process, 
Lambert’s belief in religious liberty of conscience, which he shared with Vane, 
caused him to become identified with a growing Quaker threat that was crucial in 
precipitating the Restoration of Charles II.  In the end Lambert ‘was simply not 
trusted’ (p. 214), by republicans such as Sir Arthur Haselrig as well as by Royalists.  
The army found that by 1659-60 it ‘had no natural allies’ (p. 214), and ‘increasingly 
until the Restoration Lambert’s options were limited by having to enforce through the 
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military the settlement he wanted’ (p. 230).  Lambert’s role within the army was thus 
ultimately responsible for the collapse of his political career. 
 Just as Lambert’s military position guided his political attitudes, so his politics 
in turn shaped his religious priorities.  Farr argues perceptively that Lambert’s 
religious beliefs were inseparable from his political position.  For example, his wish 
to extend liberty of conscience, plainly evident in the Heads and the Instrument, 
reflected his belief that ‘the right approach was to make sure that the requisite 
constitutional context was in place to support the religious toleration he desired.  For 
Lambert the constitutional issues, especially the jurisdiction of Parliament, crucially 
underpinned the religious issues’ (p. 179).  Similarly, ‘the essence for Lambert of the 
Nayler case was that he did not want Parliament to have unlimited judicial power’ (p. 
182).  He advocated leniency towards Nayler because he feared that Parliament’s 
judicial role might lead it to act as ‘an arbitrary power’ (p. 182). 
 Over Nayler, as over the kingship, Lambert thus emerged as ‘a symbol of 
army rule’ (p. 182).  This was appropriate for someone whose political prominence 
ultimately rested on his military skills and achievements.  Farr writes that by 1650 
‘there were clear signs of a deterioration in Cromwell’s ability to lead in the field as 
age and the rigours of the Irish campaign took their toll’ (p. 91).  He argues 
persuasively that by this time Lambert ‘was emerging as probably the most effective 
field commander’, and that in the Dunbar and Worcester campaigns he ‘thoroughly 
out-generalled’ Cromwell, who was twenty years his senior (p. 91).  Thereafter, 
however, Cromwell had one great political advantage over Lambert: ‘Cromwell’s 
character could span the ideological differences in the state much better than 
Lambert’s ever could … Cromwell’s character and experience enabled him to span 
the army and “country” more than any other figure in the military.  He sought 
“reconciliation” between these two groups’ (pp. 150, 152).  If this was the key to 
Cromwell’s dominance during the Interregnum, the relationship between Lambert’s 
military activities and his own political career remains difficult to reconstruct 
precisely.  Farr admits that ‘without direct first-hand testimony it is clearly difficult to 
quantify how Lambert’s experiences on the battlefield, but also as part of an officer 
corps with a truly revolutionary core, reshaped his approach to politics and religion’ 
(p. 228).  The most that historians can do, perhaps, is to show this process working in 
action, on specific occasions and through particular policies, and Farr is to be 
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A similarly favourable assessment of Lambert’s military abilities can be found in 
Alan Marshall’s Oliver Cromwell, soldier, where he is described as ‘an asset’ to 
Cromwell: 
A far different character from the complicated Oliver, he was a daring, handsome, brave and 
intelligent soldier … He was a lover of fine art, literature, horticulture and good clothes.  With 
his handsome wife and bold attitude, he was also much beloved by the soldiers.  Indeed, later 
some were to say that Dunbar was as much Lambert’s victory as Cromwell’s, and it is clear 
that the latter relied on Lambert for his advice (p. 236). 
Marshall has performed a very useful service in writing a military biography of 
Cromwell.  Political biographies abound – three excellent ones have appeared within 
the last fifteen years alone10 – but his military career has received less attention from 
recent historians apart from an excellent article by Austin Woolrych and Peter 
Gaunt’s invaluable Cromwellian gazetteer.11  Marshall’s book is thus a distinctive 
addition to the vast literature on Cromwell.  It combines military history with 
biography very elegantly, and manages to sketch in the rapidly changing military 
context without losing its primary focus on Cromwell’s own activities and 
contributions.  The accounts of battles are clear, accessible and interesting, and there 
are fourteen very helpful maps as well as some good black-and-white photographs. 
 Whilst very carefully and thoroughly researched, and judicious in its critical 
use of sources,12 this book is probably notable more for its judgements and 
reassessments than for any major new archival discoveries.  Marshall does not, for 
example, throw much fresh light on events such as Charles I’s arrest at Holmby 
House in 1647, or Pride’s Purge the following year, and the extent of Cromwell’s 
prior knowledge of – and involvement in – those episodes ultimately remains as 
mysterious as ever.  More interesting is Marshall’s re-evaluation of the nature and 
trajectory of Cromwell’s military career.  He points out how brief it was, for it only 
seriously got underway with Cromwell’s appointment as a colonel of cavalry in 1643, 
and it ended in 1651.  Only three times did he command more than 10,000 men: at 
Preston (1648), Dunbar (1650) and Worcester (1651).  Marshall does full justice to 
‘the generally neglected campaign of Preston’, which he argues ‘showed Oliver 
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Cromwell’s genuine abilities as an astute and aggressive soldier’ (p. 160).  
Nevertheless, he feels that Cromwell ‘as a commander, peaked at some point around 
1644-5.  By this stage he had learned all he needed to know of the technical side of 
soldiering for the purpose of the Civil Wars … Thereafter, as a soldier he rested on a 
level developmental plateau’ (p. 273).  This is a striking and persuasive verdict.  
Marshall also offers an illuminating reassessment of Cromwell’s notorious Irish 
campaign in the autumn of 1649, based on distinguishing between the two massacres 
of Drogheda and Wexford: 
Drogheda was an appalling atrocity, even by seventeenth-century standards, which in the end 
seems to have stirred misgivings even in Cromwell himself.  We can see this in the plethora of 
excuses doled out by him afterwards … His anger and hatred got the better of him.  Wexford 
was a different case.  Here Cromwell controlled his temper and would have taken the town on 
terms, but his men pre-empted him.  That said, he was dilatory in preventing the deaths that 
occurred, seemingly regarding them as part of God’s punishment as a Providential 
opportunity (p. 233). 
On Cromwell’s qualities as a soldier, Marshall has much of interest to say.  In 
common with most recent scholars, he finds the roots of Cromwell’s motivation and 
energy in his religious beliefs, and writes that ‘in his military career, the key to 
understanding his actions nearly always lies in his relationship with God’ (p. 24).  
‘His campaigns were, in many senses, “holy wars”’ (p. 273), and ‘he often seems to 
have seen in [combat] something truly divine’ (p. 276).  Among his qualities as a 
leader in battles, ‘unquestionably supreme was Cromwell’s hard-won and strongly 
held faith in himself and his God’ (p. 269).  Furthermore, his faith gave a confidence 
of victory that was self-fulfilling: ‘the idea of Cromwell being part of the Divine Will 
was reinforced by his successes as a commander in the field; the one fed upon the 
other, and became self-sustaining’ (p. 26).  Such a portrait is wholly consistent with 
the prevailing view of recent historiography. 
Cromwell’s deep religious faith helped to make him an inspirational 
commander who led by example, from the front rank.  Well aware of the importance 
of logistics, he realised the need for money and good supplies, and he often had to 
struggle to secure these, especially in the early years of the first Civil War.  But what 
was really distinctive about him as a commander in the field – Marshall calls it his 
‘greatest tactical innovation’ – was ‘the inculcation of sufficient discipline in his men 
to hold them in check and recover them after the first charge’ (p. 283).  This enabled 
Cromwell’s men to charge into the enemy, disperse them, and then regroup quickly 
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enough to reverse and attack them from the rear.  Although the origins of Cromwell’s 
talent remain obscure, Marshall thoughtfully notes that even in 1642 ‘a natural 
instinct for tactics in the field was already grounded in his love of hunting and horses’ 
(p. 28).  In the end, this is probably about as far as we can go in explaining why a 
fenland farmer with no military experience prior to 1642 should have emerged as 
such a remarkable commander of cavalry thereafter. 
 My only real reservation about Marshall’s book is that it does not analyse as 
rigorously as it might the relationship between Cromwell’s military career and his 
emergence into political prominence.  We are told that ‘military success gave him 
public stature’ (p. 271), but exactly how, when and why did military success translate 
into political influence?  It is left unclear how far Cromwell’s role in the Long 
Parliament after 1642, for example, or his promotion of the Heads of the Proposals in 
the summer and autumn of 1647, were dependent on his military rank and 
achievements.  At times, Marshall’s account tends to treat Cromwell’s record as a 
soldier in isolation from other aspects of his career, and a more integrated approach 
would have been helpful in elucidating just how important his success on the 
battlefield was as a foundation for national political significance.  It would also be 
interesting to explore the extent to which military success in this period necessarily 
led to political influence, or whether this varied so much between individuals that it 
becomes impossible to generalize. 
 
V 
More broadly, the nature of the relationship between the military and the political 
stands out as one of the most crucial but also intractable problems that confront the 
continuing attempts of historians to reconstruct Cromwellian England.  The army 
simultaneously sustained the republic, yet prevented Cromwell from achieving 
‘healing and settling’ and realizing his vision of a godly commonwealth.  Without the 
army, the Protectorate could never have survived as long as it did; but by its very 
existence and its own actions the army also ensured that the regime’s potential to 
secure support for the cause of godly reform was greatly curtailed.  The army at once 
sustained and stunted the Cromwellian Protectorate.  The religious zeal that propelled 
Cromwell and the Major-Generals through their military and political careers also 
prevented them from generating lasting stability.  There is surely much more for 
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historians to do in exploring these themes, in particular through more detailed studies 
of Protectorate politics, more research probing the connections between military and 
political developments, and more biographies of key figures whose careers as soldiers 
brought them into political prominence.  How far can their political attitudes and 
activities only be understood in terms of their military careers?  Did their military 
backgrounds do more to help or to hinder their contribution to politics and 
government?  How great was the impact of military methods and priorities on the 
workings of government throughout the Interregnum?  To what extent were military 
rule and the rule of law mutually exclusive, or was it possible for them to co-exist?  It 
is a compliment to, rather than a criticism of, these four valuable books to say that 
after reading them, many of these questions still remain to be fully answered, and that 
much further has yet to be done in unravelling them. 
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